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SIPDIS

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DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24  
CIA FOR WINPAC  
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA  
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP  
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP  
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP  
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR  
NSC FOR LOOK  
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019  
TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)  
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA  
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) AD HOC GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 7, 2009

REF: GENEVA 0920 (SFO-GVA-VI-009)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States  
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-113

2. (U) Meeting Date: December 7, 2009  
Time: 3:00 P.M. - 4:00 P.M.  
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY  
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3. (S) At an Ad Hoc Group meeting chaired by Secretary of Defense Representative, Dr. Warner, and Russian Ministry of Defense Representative, Col Ilin, the entire meeting was devoted to a discussion of counting rules as related to the formerly Russian-proposed, and now U.S.-supported, separate limit on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. The U.S. side noted that it had revised its assessment of the potential utility of the Russian-proposed combined limit on deployed and non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. Such a limit was now pegged at a level 100 units higher than the agreed strategic delivery vehicle (SDV) limit as the likely agreed limit on SDVs had begun to approach 750. At this level, the United States had come to support a limit on non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, whether it was achieved via a separate limit of roughly 150, as General Jones had proposed in Moscow in late October, or via a combined ceiling on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. The Russians discussed the impact of the combined limit at higher

than the original level they had proposed and suggested that non-deployed heavy bombers be included in that limit as well. End Summary.

14. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Russian Concept Demonstrated; Unresolved Issues Affecting SDV Limit; What SOA Are Included in U.S. Concept.

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RUSSIAN CONCEPT DEMONSTRATED  
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15. (S) Warner began the meeting stating that A/S Gottemoeller and Ambassador Antonov agreed that a meeting to discuss Article II central limits would be useful. The sides had previously discussed the Russian concept for a limit of 500 SDVs and an additional limit of 600 on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers on October 21 (Reftel). At that time, the U.S. side demonstrated that since a side could determine the composition of its forces, under the Russian-proposed separate limit, the Russian side could readily fit under the combined limit, particularly if it was set as high as 850 or 950. Consequently, the Russian concept would provide little incentive for the Russia to eliminate either ICBM or SLBM launchers. Warner stated that over the past few weeks, the U.S. side had studied the Russian combined ceiling concept. It understood the logic behind the concept and had come to see the benefit of the concept at somewhat lower SDV and combined ceiling levels, for example, at 700 SDVs, as proposed by President Medvedev, which would produce a combined ceiling of 800 deployed and non-deployed

ICBM and SLBM launchers. Using a whiteboard to depict various combinations of the two limits, Warner explored the Russian concept, first using the original Russian-proposed 500 SDV limit plus a separate limit of 600 deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and then walking through the 650-700 SDV limit that had been recently proposed by President Medvedev. Warner further demonstrated the concept with a 750 SDV limit, which he said was a number that had been discussed by the U.S. senior leadership, in combination with an 850 combined launcher limit.

16. (S) Warner explained the United States was still proposing a separate limit of approximately 150 non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers that did not include deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers as the Russian concept did. However, the U.S. side had also come to support the combined limit approach as an effective means to place a needed constraint on non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers.

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UNRESOLVED ISSUES AFFECTING SDV LIMIT  
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17. (S) Warner stated that both of the U.S.-proposed approaches addressed several issues that remained unresolved: the central limit on SDVs; the question of a separate limit on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers; the concept of when a strategic system was considered deployed or non-deployed; and when an item would count against the central limit.

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WHAT SOA ARE INCLUDED IN U.S. CONCEPT  
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18. (S) Gen Poznikhir said that he understood that the United States was proposing either a separate limit on non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers or a combined limit that would be 100 above the SDV limit. He asked what items would be included in this overall, higher limit on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. Warner responded that deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers would be included in the U.S.-proposed overall limit. Poznikhir suggested that non-deployed heavy bombers should also be included in the higher ceiling on deployed and non-deployed strategic systems. Poznikhir then asked whether the U.S. proposal

would result in the elimination of strategic offensive arms (SOA), to which Warner responded that this would depend on which side's concept was accepted. The United States was looking for an approach that would provide a clear incentive to eliminate older strategic systems. This was the weak point of the current Russian approach; under the current Russian proposal, which lacked any form of a limit on non-deployed systems, very little elimination of strategic systems by either side would be required.

¶9. (S) Ilin asked what SOA the U.S. side planned to eliminate or convert under its concept of a 750 limit on SDVs combined with an overall limit of 850 deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. Warner indicated the United States planned to eliminate all of the retired B-52Gs and some of the older B-1Bs and B-52Hs currently stored at Davis-Monthan AFB, as well as the empty Peacekeeper and MMIII silos. Most of the B-1 fleet would be converted to a

non-nuclear role and some number of B-52Hs would also likely be converted to a non-nuclear role during the life of the treaty. However, under the Russian proposal, there would be little incentive to eliminate those non-deployed launchers that fell above the agreed limit, and consequently they would simply be retained as non-deployed systems.

¶10. (S) Ilin asked whether non-deployed heavy bombers would be included in the U.S. overall limit of 850 deployed and non-deployed launchers. Warner answered that so far that was not the case. To do so would only be possible if the sides decided to include a definition of a non-deployed heavy bomber in the treaty. According to the Russian definition, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments became non-deployed when it was no longer attributed to an air base and, therefore, could be included in the overall limit on deployed and non-deployed systems, should the sides agree to include these bombers in the combined limit. He reiterated that this was not the U.S. position but simply reflected an application of the Russian approach. Poznikhir remarked that the B-52Gs at the Davis-Monthan conversion or elimination facility awaiting elimination would be considered to be non-deployed, as would the SLBM launch tubes on Russian SSBNs awaiting elimination.

¶11. (S) Warner indicated the U.S. concept provided each side the opportunity to determine the composition of its force structure within the constraints of the overall SDV and combined launcher limits. This was an important attribute since force structure requirements and domestic politics had to be considered when the United States shaped its strategic nuclear forces to fit within the agreed SDV limit. Warner explained that the 14 Trident II SSBNs, 450 Minuteman silo launchers, 20 B-2s and 90 B-52Hs, which the United States currently possessed would be reduced in some manner to reach whatever overall limit was ultimately agreed between the sides. This would certainly include eliminations to meet, for example, a 750 SDV limit and an 850 overall limit on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. Adm Kuznetsov indicated that for Russia to meet an overall limit in the area of 850 would require it to eliminate 150 accumulated older non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers.

¶12. (S) Ilin stated that the Russian side would study the two U.S. approaches to limiting non-deployed launchers and request instructions from Moscow.

¶13. (U) Documents provided. None.

¶14. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Dr. Warner  
Mr. Elliott  
Mr. Hanchett  
Ab Ries  
Mr. Siemon  
Mr. Trout

Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin

Mr. Koshelev

Adm Kuznetsov

Gen Orlov

Gen Poznihir

Col Ryzhkov

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)

¶15. (U) Gottemoeller sends.  
GRIFFITHS